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“The report of my illness grew out of his illness. The
report of my death was an exaggeration.”1
—Mark Twain
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research v. United States, the Supreme Court announced that
it was “not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative
review good for tax law only.”2 Following Mayo, it has come into
vogue among scholars of tax law to declare the death of tax
exceptionalism.3 Like the reports of Mark Twain’s death, these
The Mayo Court itself
pronouncements are exaggerations.4
1 See TWAINQUOTES.COM, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2015) (displaying an image of a note written by Mark Twain). Somewhat ironically, this
quotation has often been misreported as “Reports [or rumors] of my death have been greatly
exaggerated.” See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1153 n.55
(2006) (documenting the common confusion); Wendy Parker, The Future of School
Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1161 n.29 (2000) (noting and correcting the quoted
error).
2 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
3 See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 466
(2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court rejected tax exceptionalism . . . .”); Steve R. Johnson, Preserving
Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012) (noting that
“the Mayo Court disposed of tax exceptionalism,” while cautioning that “[p]recisely how far we
can go in this direction remains to be seen” due to the “revenue imperative”); Leandra
Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 643, 696–98 (2012) (proposing to consider facts surrounding issuance of rule under
applicable deference standard and noting that the Mayo Court was “loath” to create an
exception for tax cases); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA.
TAX REV. 1, 5–7 (2013) (examining how much deference should be given to IRS’s and
Treasury’s decision to issue retroactive rules to combat abuse); James M. Puckett, Embracing
the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 366–74
(2013) (arguing that the Code’s rulemaking provisions significantly modify APA procedures);
Andre L. Smith, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Federal Income Tax: May Congress
Grant the President the Authority to Set the Income Tax Rates?, 31 VA. TAX REV. 763, 778
(2012) (“The current trend, however, is towards rejecting so-called tax exceptionalism.”); Roger
Dorsey, Mayo and the End of ‘Tax Exceptionalism’ in Judicial Deference, 87 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 63, 68 (2011) (“The era of tax exceptionalism in judicial deference is over.”).
4 Others have recently pushed back, explicitly or implicitly, against the idea that tax
exceptionalism is dead. However, they have focused on rulemaking or adjudication rather
than the broader structure of tax administration. Bryan Camp has argued that the preAPA history of tax rulemaking should inform our application of the legislative versus
interpretative rule divide. See Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the
Administrative Procedure Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1714–15 (2014) (“Those who write in this
area must not fall into the presentist fallacy of assuming that the terms of the APA contain
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explicitly hedged its generalization about a uniform approach to
judicial review, leaving a foothold for those who argue that
“justification” exists for applying different approaches to judicial
review of tax administration.5 In many circumstances, such a
justification exists in the structure of tax administration under the
Internal Revenue Code (Code or I.R.C.),6 which differs from the
template set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7
Accordingly, tax exceptionalism seems likely to remain alive and
well, even if it may nominally constitute a residual phenomenon
rather than a guiding principle.
The acceptations of “tax exceptionalism” are diverse; this
Article addresses “the notion that tax law is somehow deeply
different from other law, with the result that many of the rules
that apply trans-substantively across the rest of the legal
landscape do not, or should not, apply to tax.”8 The idea of tax
exceptionalism, and criticisms of it, are not new.9 Courts seemed
meaning independent of history and of the administrative context to which they are
applied.”). Richard Murphy has suggested that the flexibility of general administrative law
concepts, such as interpretative versus legislative, could leave courts room to find tax
regulations interpretative. See Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax
Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 21, 24 (2014). Steve Johnson has proposed a nuanced
approach to the reasoned explanation requirement, based in part on prudential
considerations, with respect to IRS adjudication. See Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned
Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1773–77 (2014).
5 See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 55 (“Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less
deferential standard of review . . . . In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined
to carve out an approach . . . good for tax law only.”).
6 Title 26 of the United States Code.
7 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
8 Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1901
(2014). The compelling government interest in revenue collection is often proffered as a
justification for treating tax as special. See Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax
System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1720 (2014). Professor Hickman has estimated that “a
lot—maybe even a majority—of the effort that Treasury and the IRS spend promulgating
regulations concerns . . . functions other than raising revenue.” Id. at 1723. Accordingly,
Hickman has proposed reconsideration of certain statutory exceptions from APA
requirements. Id. These arguably “nontax programs” may well merit special analysis,
which lies beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. id. at 1761 (calling for Congress and the
courts to “contemplate more seriously the potential administrative-law implications of
situating nontax programs” in the Code).
9 One of the best known works criticizing tax exceptionalism recommended more
borrowing between tax and non-tax areas of law, a relationship which could be mutually
beneficial. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531–32 (1994) (criticizing the isolation of tax from non-
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to embrace tax exceptionalism by citing tax-specific precedents
with different standards when reviewing interpretations of law
adopted by the IRS and Treasury, rather than merging tax
jurisprudence with authorities that apply to non-tax judicial
review.10 It has only been since 2011 with Mayo that the tax bar
has seen a rejection, in at least a general way, of tax
exceptionalism by the Supreme Court. Unsurprisingly, the precise
ramifications of Mayo on the tax administration have not yet been
sorted out.
A plausible overall account of tax administration must address
rulemaking procedures. Although solicitation of pre-promulgation
public comments on proposed regulations—as occurred with the
regulations at issue in Mayo—is standard operating procedure,11
the greater context of tax guidance is not so simple. The IRS and
Treasury sometimes have not undertaken APA-style notice and
In certain scenarios, the IRS and
comment rulemaking.12
Treasury have published final regulations or other published
guidance without first (or, perhaps, ever) soliciting public

tax jurisprudence and the resulting justification of different methods of statutory
interpretation for tax versus non-tax areas of law). Professor Hickman later critiqued tax
exceptionalism in the context of judicial deference to Treasury regulations and Treasury’s
failure to undertake notice-and-comment procedures when required. See generally Kristin
E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) [hereinafter Hickman, The Need for Mead] (arguing that the
Chevron/Mead framework should apply to Treasury regulations); Kristin E. Hickman,
Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007) [hereinafter
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines] (studying the Treasury’s failure to comply with the
APA-required pattern).
10 See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 54 (“Although we have not thus far distinguished between
National Muffler and Chevron, they call for different analyses of an ambiguous statute.”).
11 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(3), available at http://www.irs.gov/
irm/part32/irm_32-001-005.html#d0e347 (“Although most IRS/Treasury regulations are
interpretative, and therefore not subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA, the
Service usually solicits public comment when it promulgates a rule.”).
12 See infra Part III.A.2. Under the APA, a “rule” is “the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). An adjudication, on the other hand, is
the process for “the formulation of an order.” Id. § 551(7). An “order” is “the whole or a part of
a final disposition . . . in a matter other than rule making.” Id. § 551(6). Adjudication is thus
a residual category where an action does not constitute rulemaking.
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comments.13 In other situations, the IRS and Treasury have
issued immediately effective temporary regulations with
comments to follow, before finalizing regulations.14 The IRS and
Treasury sometimes issue rules designed to affect pending
litigation, and occasionally issue rules with retroactive effect.15
The IRS has claimed that most tax regulations are interpretative
and accordingly exempt from APA notice and comment rulemaking
procedures.16 Indeed, even post-Mayo, the IRS continues to
assume that most tax regulations will qualify as interpretative.17
Moreover, the IRS issues a substantial amount of subregulatory
guidance without soliciting comments from the public.18
Taxpayers are generally subject to penalties for negligence or
disregard of regulations and other published subregulatory
guidance.19

13 See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 9, at 1736–37 (noting that the
Treasury maintains that “most” of its regulations are “interpretative” and do not require
notice-and-comment).
14 See id. at 1748–49 (finding that the Treasury issued legally-binding temporary
regulations simultaneously with a notice of proposed rulemaking for 36.2% of projects from
2003–05).
15 In a post-Mayo tax controversy, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide
guidance with respect to questions surrounding litigation oriented and retroactive tax
regulations, but did not address such issues because it found the statute unambiguous. See
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842–44 (2012); Puckett,
supra note 3, at 372 (noting that after Home Concrete, “it remains unclear what the Court
thinks about validity of and deference applicable to temporary regulations in general, or
retroactive temporary regulations in particular”).
16 See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 9, at 1729; see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(A) (exempting interpretative rules from informal rulemaking procedures).
17 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 11, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(2). The IRS’s logic tracks
the leading distinction in case law that there is a continuum between new rules and
interpretations of law:
[M]ost IRS/Treasury regulations will be interpretative regulations because
they fill gaps in legislation or have a prior existence in the law . . . [and] the
underlying Internal Revenue Code section imposing the tax or providing for
collection of a tax will provide an adequate legislative basis for the action in
the regulations.
Id.
18 See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 9, at 1804 (describing methods
used by the IRS to give taxpayers guidance, other than regulation).
19 See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (2012) (listing categories of underpayments of tax that are subject
to penalties); see also Hickman, The Need for Mead, supra note 9, at 1605 (noting that
Congress used the same “rules and regulations” terminology in section 6662 (imposing
penalties) as in section 7805 (granting authority to the IRS and Treasury to issue
guidance)).
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Mayo provides a general principle but its precise holding is that
a notice and comment tax regulation should be analyzed under the
familiar two-step Chevron20 framework rather than the less
deferential multifactor National Muffler21 tax decision.22
Accordingly, questions remain as to what tax rules qualify as
“interpretative,” the validity of temporary tax regulations, and
what deference courts should apply when reviewing tax rules,
whether regulations or subregulatory guidance, that were issued
without following the APA’s notice and comment procedures.
To think critically about the implications of Mayo for tax, one
must take a step back from tax administration and think about
non-tax administrative law. A typical administrative agency
combines prospective rulemaking, enforcement, and retroactive
This structure
adjudicatory powers under one umbrella.23
presents a potential for an agency to overreach or abuse power.
Ordinarily, however, without specific evidence of actual bias, no
serious constitutional issue arises:
The contention that the combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an
unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative
adjudication has a much more difficult burden of
persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption
of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
22 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011)
(“Chevron . . . rather than National Muffler . . . provide[s] the appropriate framework for
evaluating the full-time employee rule.”).
23 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(“Under most regulatory schemes, rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers are
combined in a single administrative authority.” (exemplifying with the Federal Trade
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications
Commission)); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 638 (1996) (noting that the “typical
administrative agency has power not only to adopt ‘legislative’ rules, but also to enforce
those rules and to adjudicate cases arising under them”); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
808–09 (2013) (showing that a survey of agencies “confirms an assertion fairly common in
the literature that the authority to proceed through adjudication is common and not limited
to agencies with statutory removal protection”).
20
21
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realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses
such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.24
Thus, administrative agencies routinely promulgate rules, bring
suit to enforce those rules, and adjudicate controversies.25
Moreover, recent research has persuasively challenged a
commonly held understanding that the modern administrative
state represents a fall from grace tolerable only because of
necessity and changed circumstances.26
Tax administration, however, is anything but typical. Indeed, it
contrasts starkly with the APA, including both seemingly protaxpayer and anti-taxpayer departures from the APA template.27
A potentially powerful protection for taxpayers is the vesting of
formal adjudicatory powers primarily in the courts rather than the
This protection stacks up against several taxpayerIRS.28
resistant structural features.
The Code permits tax rules to take effect retroactively;29 in
contrast, the Supreme Court has construed the APA to generally
prohibit agencies from issuing rules with a retroactive effective
date.30 Although a retroactive rule does not quite find facts in a
controversy, it can have quasi-adjudicatory effects by prescribing
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
Formal adjudication is subject to various procedural safeguards in the APA, limiting,
among other things, ex parte contact, providing for independence of the presiding officer,
and requiring decisions to be based on the record. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554(d), 556(b), (d) (2012).
26 See infra Part II.A.
27 See infra Part III.
28 This unduly simplifies the labyrinthine tax litigation process. For a more thorough
description, see Part III.B.
29 I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012).
30 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). In Bowen, the Court
explained, “Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language
requires this result.” Id. Moreover, “[b]y the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative
rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power
to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express
terms.” Id.
24
25

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

11/17/2015 11:46 AM

1074

[Vol. 49:1067

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

rules of decision with the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, subject
to very narrow exceptions, the Code and the Declaratory Judgment
Act generally compel taxpayers to challenge Treasury Regulations
Accordingly, unlike most regulated
only post-enforcement.31
parties, taxpayers cannot generally vet their position in court
without risking additional tax liability and may view procedural
resistance as futile.32 In sum, the structure of tax rulemaking
makes it far more difficult to defuse tax collection through
procedural challenges, but the Code denies the IRS the ability to
find the facts and set the record in the first instance.33
Because the Code supplants the APA in these important ways,
the death knells for tax exceptionalism should be quite muffled.
Yet the literature has failed adequately to focus on how the overall
structure of tax administration, rulemaking, and adjudication
articulate together and could possibly account for one another.34 A
more balanced treatment shows that the structure as a whole
promotes equal treatment of similar taxpayers, affords taxpayers
an opportunity for individualized justice, and promotes the
production of guidance for taxpayers. To be sure, there are
alternatives; however, this Article insists that other
administrative structures would entail a mix of gains and losses
compared to the status quo.
This Article argues that it is misleading to declare the death of
tax exceptionalism and that structural tax exceptionalism may have
important benefits. Part II provides a brief historical overview of
the rise of federal agency administration of statutes and especially
tax laws. The history tends to detract from anti-tax and antiSee I.R.C. § 7421 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1153, 1193 (2008) (positing that “taxpayers may perceive that challenging temporary
Treasury regulations on APA procedural grounds is a futile act not worth the effort”).
33 This tendency toward court adjudication rather than administrative adjudication may
increase the overall costs of adjudicating tax controversies without providing offsetting
benefits. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Preventive Tax Policy: Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor’s Tax
Philosophy, 22–25 (UCLA Sch. of Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 07-27, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010484 (describing Justice
Traynor and Stanley S. Surrey’s proposal to increase inexpensive administrative solutions
to tax disputes).
34 See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 3, at 470 (“I limit my analysis of the relationship
between Chevron deference and the force of law to the rulemaking sphere and defer
considering agency adjudication.”).
31
32
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agency rhetoric that counsel disempowering the Treasury
Department
and
other
administrative
agencies
from
comprehensively enforcing laws and making policy in their relevant
domains.
Moreover, structural tax exceptionalism may be
explained in part as an accident of its earlier roots and the unique
historical development of the tax administration compared to
administrative agencies in general.35 Part III analyzes how the
Code’s structure for tax administration differs from the APA
template for administrative agencies. Some of the most important
differences include an arguably pro-taxpayer, court-centered
adjudication pathway;36 meanwhile, the IRS and Treasury are
vested with greater flexibility in promulgating guidance than the
typical administrative agency, and judicial interference with tax
administration is quite limited until attempted collection.37 Part IV
deconstructs these differences, drawing from general administrative
law scholarship to identify potential advantages and drawbacks of
structural tax exceptionalism.
This Article concludes by
recommending caution before dismantling the exceptional features
of tax administration. It is undeniable that the current tax system
is imperfect, but it is unclear that turning the structure of tax
administration on its head—and thereby taking on the problems of
a typical administrative agency—will improve tax administration.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
This Part summarizes the rise of federal agency administration,
including tax collection. This discussion serves two purposes. First,
situating tax administration in historical context anticipates a
fundamental question that some inside the tax community would
naturally ask: Whether today’s administrative landscape is
radically different and unrecognizable from that of the Framers and
accordingly illegitimate. Though it has been developed elsewhere in
both general administrative law scholarship and in tax scholarship,
this history is not well known in the tax bar, and some reflexive
hostility to Chevron and Mayo likely derive from mistaken

35
36
37

See infra Part II.B–C.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part III.A.2–3.
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assumptions about the history.38 Second, the historical background
helps to explain the unusual structure of tax administration today;
deeper roots and distinctive problems arguably have led to an
exceptional structure of tax administration.
A. THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Even with the APA as a “bill of rights for the new regulatory
state,”39 legal scholars have raised serious criticisms of the
constitutionality of the modern administrative state.40 Broadly
conceived, the APA provides the public with procedural rights,
input into the regulatory process, and ensures that a record exists
for adequate judicial review. Nevertheless, critics such as Gary
Lawson have decried the “bloodless constitutional revolution”41:
The constitutional separation of powers is a means to
safeguard the liberty of the people. In Madison’s
famous words, “[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The
destruction of this principle of separation of powers is
perhaps the crowning jewel of the modern
administrative revolution. Administrative agencies
routinely combine all three governmental functions in
the same body, and even in the same people within
that body.42

38 See Hickman, supra note 3, at 532 (“Tax practitioners are already dismayed by the
power they perceive the Mayo decision has given to Treasury to dictate legal outcomes.”).
39 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996).
40 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
41 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1231 (1994).
42 Id. at 1248 (footnotes omitted). Approving of New Deal criticism, Cass Sunstein similarly
observed that the New Deal “altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to
suggest that something akin to a constitutional amendment had taken place.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447–48 (1987).
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As John McGinnis explains, “over time, special interests have
urged Congress to grant broad delegations of legislative power to
agencies whose rulemaking processes can be captured more
readily than the complicated and burdensome legislative
process.”43 According to this fall from grace narrative, “The rise of
the modern administrative state has created the possibility of
massive substitution of administrative discretion for the original
restraints of bicameralism and presentment.”44 This critique need
not be repeated here at length.
Such longstanding originalist critiques of administrative
tyranny and illegitimacy have suffered an impactful blow in Jerry
Mashaw’s historical analysis of the rise of the administrative
Professor Mashaw examines the understudied first
state.45
hundred years of federal administration, including tax collection
and other government functions.46 Mashaw uncovers a decidedly
pragmatic bent to federal administration of tax and other law:
There simply never was a time in which federal public
law was self-executing, fully specified by Congress, and
enforced through judicial decree. Nor was there a time
when administrative officials were directly under the
control of the President and subject to his direction in
all matters great or small. To the extent that we model
our contemporary jurisprudence on the idea that the
administrative state is sad evidence of the decline of
American democracy and the rule of law, we imagine a
non-administrative state that never was. . . . The
American administrative constitution has been a
continuous experiment in institutional design that has
sought, through a host of differing techniques, to

43 John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J.
901, 916 (2001) (arguing that the expansion of agency discretion offers an opportunity to
circumvent bicameralism and presentment).
44 See id. at 917 (noting that agency heads, not the President, issue most regulations
under authority from Congress).
45 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (dispelling the
“myths” that led to these critiques).
46 Id. at 5, 17–25, 34–37.
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accommodate administrative efficacy to multiple
conceptions of democracy and the rule of law.47
Accordingly, to the extent that proponents of administrative
flexibility have conceded on history and justified modern agencies
on grounds of necessity, they appear to have conceded too much.
As Mashaw writes, “We tell ourselves stories about the modern
administrative state that unduly delegitimate its constitutional
status and mislead us to some degree about the sources of
administrative law that might provide the building blocks for
effective reforms.”48
Mashaw synthesizes several “patterns of pragmatism” in the
early history of the United States that are contrary to the
narrative that modern administrative governance constitutes a
departure in kind from the practices of the earliest Congresses.49
First, administration was not always “lodged in departments and
accountable directly and exclusively to the President.”50 Second,
though Congress sometimes “micromanaged administration,”51
delegation was more common; indeed, “many early statutes not
only required public administration, they were almost devoid of
policy direction.”52 This left to administrative officials the space to
govern through “general rules and by the adjudication of countless
claims and disputes.”53
Notwithstanding the relative specificity of early revenue laws,
customs administration illustrates the practical limits of statutory
Id. at 312.
Id. at 286; see also id. at 288 & 409 n.8 (“By the end of the Second World War America
had created a large administrative state that was believed by some, particularly leaders of
the American Bar Association, to be lurching toward tyranny. . . . Similarly, agencies’
combination of legislative, executive, and judicial functions struck many as dangerously
aggrandizing executive power and creating the potential for bias and prejudgment in
administrative determinations.”).
49 “Commentators relentlessly bemoan the loss of political or popular control over
administration that they associate with the Republic’s first hundred years.” Id. at 50, 308.
50 Id. at 50–51.
51 Id. at 44.
As an example of micromanagement, Congress enacted a “detailed and
complex” excise tax collection system with respect to distilled spirits in 1791. Id. at 37. The
statute “occupies fifteen pages in the Statutes at Large and specifies everything from the
brand of hydrometer to be used in testing proof to the exact lettering to be used . . . to
identify revenue offices.” Id. at 44.
52 Id. at 51.
53 Id.
47
48
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specificity—even in a tax system that was much simpler than the
current regime:
Statutes could specify the level of the tax and on what it
should be levied. But when objective tests, such as
proof measured by a specific type of hydrometer, were
not feasible, judgment by revenue officers was
inevitable concerning the nature or grade of the articles
taxed and their value. Administrative discretion was
also required precisely to avoid the injustice of rigid
application of highly specific statutory requirements.
Tax collectors, for example, were given the power to
excuse offenses when there had been “substantial
compliance” or no “intent to defraud,” or when a
violation was caused by unavoidable circumstances.54
Thus, the administration of customs duties belies the notion that
“early congressional practice establishes a narrow view of what
could constitutionally be delegated to administrative officials.”55
Ironically enough, tax administration seems to have been from the
beginning both exceptional and unexceptional: vast discretion
turned out to be inherent even in a highly specified system.
Importantly, “the specificity of revenue and postal statutes was
in many ways exceptional.”56 But even then, as noted above,
delegation, discretion, and pragmatic function took hold, and not
just in tax administration. As a non-tax example, the postal
service is instructive in largely the same way as customs. Prodelegation and anti-delegation factions in Congress quarreled over
the specificity of the design of the postal service, and the antidelegation faction declared a limited victory with careful
specification of stations and rates.57 Nevertheless, the Postmaster
General garnered substantial discretion to create additional post
roads, enter into contracts for mail carriage, and regulate the acts
of subordinates.58 Mashaw also notes that the three-member

54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
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Patent Office was perhaps the first independent commission,
consisting of the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and
Secretary of War; this “board of eminent political appointees”
exercised quasi-judicial powers.59
Much of the foregoing structural analysis would not necessarily
shock or alter the conclusions of a pragmatic or functionalist
defender of the modern administrative state.60 But Mashaw’s
work suggests that pragmatists should be less apologetic, and
originalists should be less hostile to the delegation and deference
trends with respect to modern agencies.
Mashaw’s work also reaffirms that the scope of judicial review
of agency action has become broader, while standards of review
have often become more deferential. Acknowledging that judicial
review was indeed very different, Mashaw takes issue with
Frederic Lee’s critique61 of the effectiveness of early judicial review
of administrative action.62 A full menu of common law forms of
action was available to contest much administrative action.63
Unlike today’s administrative practice—where lawsuits target the
government and injunctive and declaratory relief are the norm—
administrative challenges in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries were against the administrator in his personal capacity,
and damages were the norm.64 Meanwhile, courts restricted
mandamus relief to non-discretionary matters in a very strict

Id. at 50.
See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 451 (“The goals of limited government and stability,
originally of considerable importance to the distribution of national powers, provide the
least compelling justification for a return to the original constitutional framework. The
reasons are both practical and conceptual.”).
61 See Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO.
L.J. 287, 291 (1948) (asking rhetorically: “The right to collateral review through the relatively
unimportant common law remedies, such as trover, detinue, assumpsit, and replevin, against
executive officers who had acted in excess of their jurisdiction, was not questioned. But could
their actions be directly reviewed by the courts through mandamus, injunction or appeal?”).
62 See MASHAW, supra note 45, at 76 (“To take the breadth issue first, is Frederic Lee
correct that the common law remedies left too much official action outside the scope of
effective judicial review? As to the Federalist period, my hesitant conclusion is ‘not
really.’ ”); see also id. at 308 (“And, they by and large view judicial review as nonexistent
until the early twentieth century.”).
63 See id. at 76 (“A host of standard common law actions . . . were available to test the
legality of these official actions.”).
64 See id. at 75–76.
59
60
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sense;65 accordingly, policy review such as we have internalized
today was virtually non-existent.66
Courts generally reviewed administrative action on a de novo
basis, provided that the plaintiff could state a common law claim
To be sure, there were some
against an administrator.67
exceptional categories where no common law action would lie,68
and in exceptional cases such as land patents courts applied a “res
judicata” model allowing for very little substantive review,69 but
generally the prospect of defending a lawsuit constrained
administrative action.70
In the tax context, the structure and incentives were again
somewhat exceptional. Customs agents and other tax enforcement
agents, like many other administrative agents at the time, worked
in part on commission.71 Though collectors potentially faced
common law claims in state court, they were shielded by an
unusual statutory defense of reasonable cause, and could recoup
doubled legal fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs.72 On the other
hand, fact finding would take place before a potentially hostile
state court or jury.73 The possibility of a suit in an unfriendly
state court could be debilitating to collection efforts.74 Though it is
unclear how well the protective features worked, in a back of the
envelope manner the incentives could be seen as roughly balanced
between deterring administrative corruption and tax evasion.75

Id. at 302.
See id. at 308 (observing that “the willingness of modern courts, at the behest of
modern Congresses, to insert themselves into the policy processes of administrative decision
making represents the most substantial change in our administrative constitution over
these 200-plus years”).
67 See id. at 302 (“[T]o the extent that courts were presented with common law actions
against federal officers, they exercised de novo review.”).
68 See id. at 77 (noting that while denial of a ship license or passport might not be
reviewable, the area was “noncontentious”).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 136–43.
71 Id. at 61; see also NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE, THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 192–94 (2013).
72 MASHAW, supra note 45, at 73.
73 Id. at 71–73.
74 See id. (describing a case of state court tax nullification). As Mashaw puts it, “Judicial
review in a de novo form could be enormously intrusive, indeed paralyzing, at the hands of
nineteenth-century courts and juries.” Id. at 308.
75 See id. at 73.
65
66

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

11/17/2015 11:46 AM

1082

[Vol. 49:1067

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

The standard narrative roots administrative agencies in the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)76 created in 1887.77 As
Mashaw has documented, an explosion of administrative activity
began somewhat earlier, with Congress granting “virtual carte
blanche” to agencies with respect to quarantines, steamboat
regulation, and pre-ICC railroad regulation.78 Substantial growth
(for example, the Federal Trade Commission) of federal agencies
continued into the early twentieth century even with conservatives
The Great Depression spurred the creation of
in power.79
administrative agencies.80 Under Roosevelt, “[a]n avalanche of
new federal agencies and commissions — including the National
Recovery Administration, the NLRB, and the SEC — reached ever
more broadly into a free market that appeared to have failed.”81
In the early twentieth century, judicial review also took first
steps toward a system recognizably like our modern system. In
particular, “mandamus jurisprudence nevertheless reflected
movement toward reconceptualizing direct judicial review as a
public action designed to control official behavior rather than as a
private lawsuit between individuals, one of whom happened to
occupy a public office.”82 However, change toward a public action
was “incremental and began inauspiciously.”83
According to Louis Jaffe’s account,84 the Supreme Court crafted
a presumption of reviewability for administrative action in the
1902 case American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.85
Despite the long history of a bimodal (all or nothing) judicial
review model, the Court concluded that the “acts of all . . . officers
must be justified by some law, and in case an official violates the
law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have

76 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1986).
77 MASHAW, supra note 45, at 4 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985)).
78 Id. at 240–44.
79 See Shepherd, supra note 39, at 1561–62.
80 Id. at 1561.
81 Id. at 1562.
82 MASHAW, supra note 45, at 245.
83 Id.
84 LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327–53 (1965).
85 187 U.S. 94 (1902); JAFFE, supra note 84, at 339.
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jurisdiction to grant relief.”86 From this precedent, judicial review
gradually evolved to a more recognizable state.87
It would take numerous failed attempts at legislation dating
from 1929 before Congress and President Truman enacted the
APA.88 Conservatives and liberals had vastly different views of
how much control to impose on agencies.89 Court challenges to
administrative schemes met with some success, but ultimately the
Supreme Court witnessed the famous “switch in time that saved
nine.”90 Finally, in 1946, the APA was signed into law; it has been
“profound and durable” yet leaves many unanswered questions
because legislators could only agree on intentionally ambiguous
language with respect to fundamental principles (e.g., legislative
versus interpretative rules), the meaning of which would
ultimately be resolved by courts.91 Part III begins with a brief
overview of those concepts.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION

As mentioned in Part II.A, from the eighteenth century until the
early twentieth century, the government raised revenue primarily
from customs supplemented with internal excise taxes.92 The
predecessor to the modern income tax was a modest and
temporary income tax (along with an inheritance tax) enacted to
Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing, 187 U.S. at 108.
See JAFFE, supra note 84, at 120–51 (detailing the evolution of the Court’s primary
jurisdiction to review agency decisions); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference:
Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV.
399, 408 (2007) (noting that courts began to defer to agency determinations in subject
matters clearly within traditional notions of the police power, but scrutinized agency
determinations at the outer edge of the police power more closely).
88 See generally Shepherd, supra note 39 (detailing several failed bills leading up to the
eventual compromise of the APA).
89 See Schiller, supra note 87, at 423–25 (discussing conservative support for “adequate
checks upon administrative action” that would have resulted from the failed Walter-Logan
Bill).
90 See Shepherd, supra note 39, at 1562–63 (discussing Justice Roberts’s switch to
ultimately supporting New Deal programs and agencies).
91 See id. at 1662–66, 1678–83 (describing the ambiguous “compromise” and “scramble” of
both sides to create legislative history to support their desired interpretation).
92 See infra Part II.B; supra Part II.A (discussing the early administration of customs); see
also Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091–92 (2001) (arguing that income tax arose in response
to the inadequacy and unfairness of early consumption taxes).
86
87
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help finance the Civil War, first in 1861 and amended in 1862.93
“From a revenue perspective, the income tax was less important
than the comprehensive system of excise taxes included in the
1862 act, as well as its inheritance tax and levies on a wide range
of business activities.”94
The 1862 Act established the Office of Commissioner and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue within the Treasury Department.95
The Bureau administered remaining internal revenue taxes even
after the repeal of the Civil War income tax.96 The Bureau
initially operated through 185 geographical districts, each with a
presidentially appointed assessor and collector.97 A large group of
unappointed subordinates quickly were hired.98 The Civil War
income tax left many concepts vague; accordingly, the
Commissioner had responsibility for implementing regulations as
well as enforcing the law.99
Although collections could be described as a success, it is not
entirely surprising that the first attempt at implementation of a
federal income tax was antagonistic:
But all was not well in the Bureau. The collection
system was inherently adversarial, prompting
considerable tension between officials and taxpayers.
The sweeping powers that devolved upon field staff,
especially assistant assessors, exacerbated this
problem. Both outside critics and agency officials
complained that poorly trained and inadequately
compensated personnel had hobbled the agency.100
In short, the administration of the tax was “inquisitorial,”
something tolerable in a time of crisis but less tolerable in normal
times.101 Another feature contributing to the tax’s unpopularity
93 See Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative
History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 719–22 (2001) (discussing the 1861 and 1862 income taxes).
94 Id. at 722.
95 Id. at 723.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 724 & n.19.
99 Id. at 724.
100 Id. at 725–26.
101 Id. at 726–27.
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was publicity of tax returns.102 Although publicity would seem to
be an excellent way of enforcing compliance by indirectly involving
neighbors, resentment against the practice led to its later reversal
by Congress in 1870.103 Finally, the low pay rate for Bureau
employees contributed to serious problems of staff turnover,
incompetence, and corruption.104
Despite an inquiry from a special commission on the topic of tax
administration and law, only modest staffing changes were made
in 1866.105 The Civil War income tax eventually expired after
1871, but the Bureau remained in largely the same form to
administer remaining internal excise taxes, which would—along
with customs duties—provide the bulk of federal revenue until
World War I.106 After an 1894 attempt to tax income, which was
rejected by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional direct tax
lacking apportionment,107 the next federal income tax was enacted
in 1913 after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.108 With
astronomical growth in revenue came problems of delayed
processing of returns and appeals, along with familiar allegations
of corruption and favoritism.109

Id. at 727.
Id. at 727–28.
104 See id. at 728 (discussing the problems caused by Bureau employees’ low pay). Frederic
Howe, writing in the late nineteenth century, explained the hostile reception to the Civil War
experiment with an income tax:
The income tax has always been unpopular with certain classes. It is indicted
as invading the sanctity of the most private affairs, as being inseparable from
inquisitorial scrutiny into business relations, and an insufferable intrusion
into those affairs of the individual which are in a sense sacred, and which in
the past had been exempted from the visits of the tax-gatherer. It is further
alleged that a tax which offers such opportunities for evasion is a charge upon
honesty and patriotism, and a premium upon perjury.
FREDERIC C. HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SYSTEM 1791–1895: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ORGANIZATION, DEVELOPMENT,
AND LATER MODIFICATION OF DIRECT AND EXCISE TAXATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 95–96
(1896).
105 See Thorndike, supra note 93, at 733 (explaining that the principal change in the
Bureau’s organization was “more adequate” staffing).
106 Id. at 734.
107 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583–86 (1895), modified on reh’g,
158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
108 Thorndike, supra note 93, at 740.
109 See id. at 743–50 (discussing the inefficiencies and resulting criticisms of the Bureau
during and after World War I).
102
103
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One criticism of the Bureau that may partially explain the
unusual features of modern tax rulemaking110 was that the lack of
tax guidance led to unfairness, personnel turnover, favoritism, and
corruption.111 A special commission found a direct connection
between secrecy and tax inequity:
Indeed, secrecy was as a recurring complaint in the
committee’s report. The panel pointed out that Bureau
personnel and taxpayers confronted a dearth of
published guidance and regulations. “This failure to
promulgate and publish the principles and practices to
be followed in determining tax liability has resulted in
gross discrimination between taxpayers similarly
situated[,]” the report stated.112
Moreover, the lack of guidance not only led to inequity between
similarly situated taxpayers; it also amplified the revolving door
effect, whereby insiders with valuable knowledge would leave for
lucrative private employment, while the Bureau would be left with
inadequate, poorly trained personnel.113
Even after another special commission investigated these
problems, and bitter frictions between Congress and Secretary of
the Treasury Andrew Mellon surfaced, Congress failed to enact
any fundamental reforms.114 More sweeping reform would not
take place until the 1950s.115
See infra Part III.A (describing the unusual features of tax rulemaking).
See Thorndike, supra note 93, at 751–52 (describing complaints of taxpayer oppression
and Bureau corruption).
112 Id. at 751 (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 229 (1926)).
113 Thorndike explains the dynamic thus:
Rulings were known only to insiders, including affected taxpayers, their
representatives, and relevant BIR employees. As the committee report
observed, “This system has created, as a favored class of taxpayers, those
who have employed ‘tax experts.’ It has created a special class of tax
practitioners, whose sole stock in trade is a knowledge of the secret
methods and practices of the Income Tax Unit.” Knowledge of secret
precedents had made Bureau employees extremely valuable to corporate
taxpayers, fostering a damaging rate of turnover. Only the regular
publication of BIR decisions could halt this outflow and ensure equal
treatment for all taxpayers.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 235 (1926)).
114 See id. at 751–52. Thorndike identifies only one lasting benefit of these inquiries and
debates:
110
111
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Interspersed with this history of the IRS, however, is the
history of adjudication of tax controversies.
As discussed
previously, taxpayers originally had to sue—through an implied
common law action against the collector—for a refund of a
disputed tax; in other words, there was no analog to the modern
Tax Court in which a taxpayer may challenge a deficiency without
first paying.116 Initially, this “pay first, argue later” system was
not thought to be unduly burdensome (or perhaps it was thought
to be necessary for effective enforcement); however, when tax rates
rose in the early twentieth century, demands grew for a precollection tribunal.117
In response to these concerns, Congress ultimately created
within the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Committee on Appeals and
Review to hear pre-collection disputes.118 The public, however, was
quick to call for a more independent body.119 Somewhat predictably,
taxpayers perceived a pro-revenue bias from the Committee.120
Moreover, concerns emerged that powerful, politically-connected
taxpayers might receive favors through the agency.121
Congress created the independent Board of Tax Appeals in
1924.122 After some tinkering with the scope of appellate review,
Congress largely left the Board alone until the 1940s.123 In the
Revenue Act of 1942, Congress renamed the tribunal the Tax Court
of the United States, presumably because the board exercised only

In 1926, Congress adopted Couzens’s recommendation for a permanent
committee to monitor the revenue system, including the BIR. This
committee, known as the Joint Committee on Internal Taxation, soon
became a leading repository of expertise on federal taxation and a close
partner of the Treasury Department in shaping tax policy.
Id. at 752.
115 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
116 See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 20–
21 (1979) (discussing the history of taxpayer administrative hearings).
117 See Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt from Administrative Law
Jurisprudence When Acting As a Reviewing Court?, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 617 (2010)
(discussing how the rise in tax rates led to the demand for a pre-collection tribunal).
118 See DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 39 (describing how the Committee grew out of initial,
intentionally temporary review boards).
119 Id. at 43–45.
120 Id. at 41–45.
121 See id. (noting the public’s suspicion of large tax refunds made by the Bureau).
122 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336, 336–38 (1924).
123 DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 175; Fahey, supra note 117, at 631 n.52.
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judicial functions.124 Despite the seemingly minor change, this
sparked debate concerning whether the Tax Court was really a
court or an agency and which designation would be more
misleading.125 On the one hand, the Board had only judicial
functions, but it was still not an Article III court whose judges
served with life tenure and salary protection under the
Constitution.126 Moreover, some were concerned that the new
nomenclature would be a slippery slope toward Article III status.127
For a brief interlude, as a result of Dobson v. Commissioner,128
the Tax Court’s findings of fact on appeal were reviewable on a
deferential basis as compared to district court findings of fact.129
The rationale for the Dobson decision was simple—the Tax Court
was just like any other agency, not a “court” under Article III, and
thus entitled to more deference than a district court.130 This came
to an end in 1948 when Congress reorganized appellate review of
Tax Court decisions, ending the heightened deference regime.131
Under the current § 7482(a), Tax Court decisions are reviewable
by the United States Courts of Appeals as if they were “decisions
of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”132
Two episodes in tax history finally resulted in major structural
reforms to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. First, a series of
corruption scandals in the 1950s galvanized support to reform the
Bureau.133 The result was, most importantly, elimination of the
office of collector and other political appointees below the level of
Commissioner, in an effort to uproot the influence of political
connections on collection decisions.134 Moreover, the Bureau took
on the current name Internal Revenue Service; geographic

Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957.
See DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 177–81 (describing both sides of the debate regarding
the name change generated by the Revenue Act of 1942).
126 See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957 (dictating that the appointment
and tenure of Tax Court judges would be the same as that of Board of Tax Appeals members).
127 See DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 179–80 (outlining arguments of individuals opposed
to the name change).
128 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
129 Id. at 500–01.
130 Id. at 499.
131 Rules of Decision Act of 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991, 991–98.
132 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2012).
133 Thorndike, supra note 93, at 755–59.
134 Id. at 760–62.
124
125
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districts organized by type of tax were abandoned in favor of
regional organization by function—collection, audit, appeal, etc.;
and the Service added an internal Inspection Service intended to
prevent future corruption.135
Second, in the late 1990s, renewed complaints of corruption,
ineptitude, and heavy handed enforcement tactics ultimately led to
reform legislation enacted in 1998.136 The core reform was to
attempt to make the Service more taxpayer-service-oriented.137
Some of the most important features include procedural
safeguards in the collection process (collection due process) and
rules for sanctioning and terminating Service employees.138
C. SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

With the 1998 reforms, the Service arrived essentially at its
current structure. And with this historical background—of both
the Service and administrative agencies in general—the unusual
structure of the Service today seems more reasonable. Compared
to a typical administrative agency, the Service has deeper roots.
The origins of review in a common law action against the
collector—otherwise there would have been no review—point to
why tax adjudication remains to this day split off from the IRS to
the courts. But why has Congress failed to update the IRS to the
typical agency template?
Although this Article cannot provide a purposive answer to the
question, Part IV offers certain policy considerations against Code
and APA conformity.
It seems especially plausible that
perceptions of procedural fairness explain why the tax system has
remained different from the standard agency template. Indeed,
even as revenue needs grew at times of national distress, Congress
did not assign all responsibility for tax administration to an
executive agency.139 The most dramatic tax law changes have
Id. at 762–63.
See id. at 774–75 (discussing the development and eventual passage of the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998).
137 See id. at 775 (discussing the Commission’s emphasis on meeting citizens’ needs);
David J. Herzig, Justice for All: Reimagining the Internal Revenue Service, 33 VA. TAX REV.
1, 30–32 (2013) (outlining the Act’s “core concept” of viewing the taxpayer as the client).
138 See Herzig, supra note 137, at 30 (providing examples of taxpayer protection provisions).
139 Thorndike, supra note 93, at 736 (discussing a lack of attention paid to the tax system
by Congress after World War I).
135
136
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occurred in response to wartime revenue needs,140 yet adjudication
of controversies remained primarily the province of courts.
Moreover, even if a risk of overreaching by an agency usually is
tolerable to achieve the coherency of a unified administration with
enforcement, rulemaking, and adjudicative power, the calculus
may be different for the tax system. Tax compliance directly
involves perhaps the broadest possible array of individuals and
businesses in proceedings with an agency that they distrust;
accordingly, it may simply be politically unrealistic to bestow the
IRS with more adjudicatory power than it currently exercises.141
The history of scandal at the Bureau and later the Service should
not be taken to prove too much about the overarching structural
features of tax administration. Certain historical problems could be
ascribed to lack of funding, lack of public guidance, and
overpoliticization. Congress has taken steps toward depoliticizing
the Service, and, as described in more detail below, to facilitate tax
rulemaking.142 These steps should help to lessen both the revolving
door phenomenon and also the potential for corruption.
Unfortunately, however, the contemporary Congress shows no sign
of correcting the Service’s historical underfunding problem.143
III. CONTRASTING THE MODALITIES OF FEDERAL TAX
ADMINISTRATION WITH THE APA TEMPLATE
The Administrative Procedure Act sets forth a template for how
an agency may take action in formulating and implementing policy
Although organic
through rulemaking and adjudication.144
enactments for a particular agency can and do vary the procedural
requirements and limitations applicable to particular agencies,145
Herzig, supra note 137, at 1, 8 (noting the reforms after the Civil War and World War I).
See supra Part II.B (describing the public’s historical suspicion of the Service and
perceptions of corruption).
142 See infra Part III.A.2.
143 See George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public’s Right to
Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1116 & n.4 (2014) (noting the problems caused by IRS budget
cuts).
144 See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1.
145 See, e.g., Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a
Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 506–15 (1995)
(classifying statutory limitations on agency discretion, e.g., purposive limits, subject-matter
140
141
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the APA template serves as a useful comparator for what a true
end to tax exceptionalism would resemble. This Part contrasts the
modalities of tax administration with the APA template, pointing
out that a striking degree of tax exceptionalism exists in terms of
the structure of available modalities. Indeed, the degree of
exceptionalism arguably overshadows the similarities.
A. RULEMAKING

Under the APA, administrative agencies ordinarily may
promulgate rules through a relatively informal process.146 The
required procedure depends on the kind of rule being formulated
and the organic enactment (e.g., the Internal Revenue Code).
1. Rulemaking under the APA. Promulgation of legislative
rules—rules that have the force and effect of law—requires the
enacting agency to undertake notice and comment procedures.147
These procedures on their face do not sound unduly burdensome:
an agency must give the public notice of the proposed rulemaking,
solicit comments, and respond to significant comments.148
Moreover, the rule ordinarily may take effect no sooner than thirty
days after publication of the final rule.149 Again, the effective date
provision seems innocuous on its face, but both the procedures and
the effective date provision have become significant obstructions to
agency policymaking as courts have interpreted and applied
them.150
Congress most likely intentionally, as a compromise, left the
definition of key categories of rules—legislative and
interpretative—vague.151 The doctrine has been unstable over the
limits, procedural prerequisites and limits, limits on standard setting, and limits on
regulatory method).
146 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
147 Id. Nonlegislative rules (encompassing both interpretative rules and general statements
of policy) as well as rules of agency organization and procedure are exempt from these
procedures and require no specific procedural formalities. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A). There is also an
exception for good cause. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B).
148 Id. § 553 (setting forth requirements for informal rulemaking).
149 Id. § 553(d).
Exceptions are again made for nonlegislative rules and in situations
where the agency can show good cause. See id. § 553(d)(3).
150 See generally Murphy, supra note 4 (detailing the creativity of judges in interpreting
the APA and how this has led to increased procedures for agencies to engage in
rulemaking).
151 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
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years and remains notoriously difficult to apply to particular
controversies.152 Although there are other candidates, the leading
test used in the courts appears to be a pragmatic reading of
“interpretative” that looks to whether the rule interprets rather
than adds new law, assuming the rule seems fairly binding on the
agency or the public.153 If the rule is too tentative to be binding on
the agency or the public, then the rule qualifies as a general
statement of policy.154 These doctrinal distinctions are laudable
for adhering to the text of the APA, but arguably do little to
identify those rules that should or should not be required to
undergo notice and comment procedures.
The arbitrary and capricious limitation is a general limitation
on all agency action—rulemaking or adjudication.155 However, the
standard is most typically associated with judicial review of
rulemaking.156 Agencies must make determinations in a rational
way, considering relevant factors and applying reasonable
judgment.157 Courts traditionally apply the standard in a highly
deferential manner.158 However, in the words of then-Professor

152 See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Distinguishing
between a ‘legislative’ rule . . . and an interpretive rule . . . is often very difficult—and often
very important to regulated firms, the public, and the agency.”).
153 See Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir. 2005);
Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 79–80 (1st Cir. 1998); Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 167, 171–72; cf.
Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(articulating a four-part test, an important factor of which is “whether in the absence of the
rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency
action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties”); Murphy, supra note 4, at 23
(proposing that courts should be “pragmatic and conservative” rather than “aggressive” in
their application of notice-and-comment requirements to Treasury rules); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 548
(2000) (approving of the American Mining Congress factors). But see Mada-Luna v.
Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 1987) (testing for binding effect on the agency).
154 Mada-Luna, 813 F.2d at 1015.
155 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
156 See William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 394 (2000) (examining whether or not
judicial review of informal agency rulemaking under the arbitrary and capricious standard
discourages rulemaking).
157 Id. at 397.
158 See id. at 396 (concluding that judicial review in the D.C. Circuit did not significantly
impede agencies in the pursuit of their policy goals).
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Elena Kagan, courts take a “hard look at whether the agencies
themselves have taken a hard look.”159
Historically, arbitrary and capricious review involved
something more akin to minimal rationality review. However, in
the landmark State Farm case, the Supreme Court shifted toward
requiring an agency to explain its reasoning.160 Although the
Court has recently and emphatically signaled that the arbitrary
and capricious standard is to be “narrow,”161 the standard does
require an agency to show that it actually had a reasonable
rationale at the time for its action.162 Ideal clarity in the agency’s
explanation is not required, however, if the connection between the
agency’s reasoning and action can reasonably be made.163 The
agency must offer in support of its action statutory, technocratic,
scientifically-driven, or other non-political reasons.164 To survive
judicial scrutiny, the agency’s process must “address all significant
issues, take into account all relevant data, consider all feasible
alternatives, develop an extensive evidentiary record, and provide
a detailed explanation of its conclusions.”165 A court determines
the adequacy of the agency’s process by examining the entire
record for the action under review.166
Courts tend to frame arbitrary and capricious analysis in expert
and data-driven terms.167 In response to this regime, scholars
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43
(1983); Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary
and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
541, 550–53 (1986).
161 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I), 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (“Under what we
have called this ‘narrow’ standard of review, we insist that an agency ‘examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.’ ” (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S.
at 43)).
162 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43.
163 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513–14 (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
164 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5–6 (2009).
165 See Kagan, supra note 159, at 2270.
166 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 44.
167 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (holding EPA’s decision to deny a
rulemaking petition on greenhouse gasses arbitrary and capricious for failure to provide
adequate data and scientific grounds for the denial); UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 254–56
(3d Cir. 2004) (upholding OSHA’s denial of a rulemaking petition after determining that
OSHA had adequately surveyed available scientific data); see also Wedgewood Vill.
159
160
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have split on whether to include political rationales as legitimate
reasons to justify agency action under the standard.168 More
recent judicial opinions have indicated a willingness to accept
political reasoning by agencies.169
Accordingly, an agency operating under the APA template is
faced with an incentive to undergo relatively burdensome notice
and comment rulemaking procedures, or be faced with the
prospect of seeing the rule invalidated on procedural grounds.
According to the ossification hypothesis, the prospect
of facing hard look review by the courts has caused
administrative agencies to become reluctant to use the
informal rulemaking process, with its attendant
benefits of clear prior notice, widespread public
participation, and comprehensive resolution of issues
affecting large numbers of people or economic
activities.170

Pharmacy v. DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (drawing heavily from State Farm);
Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same).
168 See Kagan, supra note 159, at 2380 (proposing that hard look review be relaxed when
the President takes an active role in shaping policy); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2010)
(arguing that in order to promote transparency, agencies should be required to disclose
influences on their decisionmaking and that some political influences may be legitimate
considerations); Watts, supra note 164, at 32–33 (arguing for an expanded scope of
acceptable reasoning under the arbitrary and capricious standard, including political
considerations). But see Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A
Response to Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 574–79 (2010) (arguing that the APA
should continue to shield agency rulemaking from the political branches and critiquing
Watts’s analysis of Fox I); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1811–12 (2012) (critiquing
political reason giving models because they would undermine the social and organizational
structures under which agencies operate).
169 See Fox I, 556 U.S. at 515, 517–18 (upholding under arbitrary and capricious review an
FCC indecency sanction, which represented a change in policy, noting the changed political
landscape in Congress and that State Farm does not require a higher standard of review for
policy change); Chao, 361 F.3d at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring) (acknowledging the role the
change in presidential administrations played in OSHA’s denial of a rulemaking petition).
170 Jordan, supra note 156, at 394 (noting but rejecting this consensus); see also M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1390–91 (2004) (“These
requirements may sound minimal, and the Congress that set them forth likely envisioned
them to be, but today, promulgating an important legislative rule is a labor-intensive
enterprise. Although there are many reasons for this, it is unquestionably due in part to
judicially imposed requirements that an agency must follow if it expects to survive a challenge
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Moreover, because the effective date generally may not precede the
issuance of the final rule under the APA, invalidation on
procedural grounds may leave no rule to cover actions taken by
regulated parties in the interim, even if the latter have full notice
of the agency’s intended course of action.171 The agency might also
avoid rulemaking in favor of adjudication, assuming an adequate
basis exists in preexisting authority.172
2. Tax Rulemaking as Modified by the Code. Tax rulemaking
under the Code differs substantially and importantly from the
APA template.173 Section 7805(b) of the Code provides explicit
authority for tax rules to take effect retroactively:
Retroactivity of regulations.—
(1) In general.—Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, no temporary, proposed, or final regulation
relating to the internal revenue laws shall apply to any
taxable period ending before the earliest of the
following dates:
(A) The date on which such regulation is filed with the
Federal Register.
(B) In the case of any final regulation, the date on
which any proposed or temporary regulation to which
such final regulation relates was filed with the Federal
Register.
(C) The date on which any notice substantially
describing the expected contents of any temporary,
proposed, or final regulation is issued to the public.
(2) Exception for promptly issued regulations.—
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to regulations filed or
issued within 18 months of the date of the enactment

to its action in court—requirements that affect an agency even if its rule does not wind up in
court.”).
171 See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in
Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 299 (2003) (noting that courts have sometimes
exercised discretion to avoid disruptions when a rule falls to a procedural challenge).
172 See Magill, supra note 170, at 1396 (discussing an agency’s selection of administrative
adjudication over legislative rulemaking).
173 See generally Puckett, supra note 3, at 368–70 (considering hybrid procedures under
section 7805(b), distinct from the APA).
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of the statutory provision to which the regulation
relates.
(3) Prevention of abuse.—The Secretary may
provide that any regulation may take effect or apply
retroactively to prevent abuse.174
Because of this unusual retroactive rulemaking option, the IRS
and Treasury arguably do not face the same incentives as a typical
agency when considering which administrative modality to utilize
to make tax policy.175 As discussed below, the differential choice of
modality analysis stems from the ability of the IRS and Treasury
to make rules effective, under ordinary circumstances, as early as
the issuance of “any notice substantially describing the expected
contents.”176
Under these rules, invalidation of a tax regulation on
procedural grounds could have very different implications for the
IRS and Treasury. It would be risky to challenge a tax regulation
on procedural grounds, assuming that the regulation may be
reissued with retroactive effect, backdated under section
7805(b)(1)(C) to the date when the public had notice of the
expected contents. That is not to say there could never be any use
to a taxpayer in mounting such a procedural challenge. Issuing a
final regulation takes time and resources; thus, a taxpayer could
obtain a favorable verdict premised on the invalidity of a
regulation, though a regulation reissued before appeal might
reverse the outcome for that taxpayer—and would apply to others.
The problems of a rule-free period pending reissuance could be
somewhat mitigated if courts remanded to the IRS.177 If courts
remanded as is ordinary in judicial review of agency action,178 the
IRS would have an opportunity to decide the matter without the
procedurally invalid rule, and might reissue a valid retroactive
rule before litigating in court again. This also would promote
equal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.

I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012).
For potential criticism of this analysis, see infra notes 189–98 and accompanying text.
176 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(C).
177 See infra Parts III.B.3, IV.A (discussing the failure of courts to remand in tax
controversies and the associated consequences).
178 See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
174
175
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Although current Code section 7805(b) already appears to
permit the IRS and Treasury much more rulemaking flexibility
than a typical agency enjoys under the APA,179 it is also possible
that old section 7805(b)—an even more retroactivity-friendly
predecessor—still applies. Prior to amendment, section 7805(b)
allowed the Treasury to “prescribe the extent, if any, to which any
ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be
applied without retroactive effect.”180 The uncodified text of the
act provides that the new section 7805(b) applies to “regulations
which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after [July 30,
1996,] the date of the enactment of this Act.”181 A key question is
whether the “enacted on or after” phrase modifies “regulations” or
“statutory provisions.” If the former pairing is correct,182 then all
new regulations would be covered by the new (and less flexible)
section 7805(b). If the latter is correct, then only regulations
relating to more recent Code sections would be covered by the new
section 7805(b).
The IRS has announced its position that only regulations
relating to post-1996 Code sections are covered by the new section
7805(b).183 This is not a mere self-serving position; arguably, it is
the reading that is most natural and does not render superfluous
the “statutory provisions” language.184 Although the IRS and
Treasury have not issued a regulation to implement that litigating
position, such a regulation would possibly be eligible for Chevron
deference.185
See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (1994) (amended 1996).
181 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(b), 110 Stat. 1468, 1469 (1996).
182 I.e., if the meaning is “regulations enacted on or after July 30, 1996.”
183 Definition of Omission in Gross Income, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
184 Otherwise, would the effective date language be carving out some regulations that do
not relate to statutory provisions? This seems like an odd reading indeed, but one that is
necessary to conclude that “enacted” relates to “regulations” rather than “statutory
provisions.” Otherwise, the words “statutory provisions” would appear to carry no weight.
185 In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Supreme Court clarified that there is no special
category of jurisdictional questions that are to be carved out of Chevron deference. 133 S.
Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013). Justice Scalia’s pithy conclusion is instructive:
Those who assert that applying Chevron to “jurisdictional” interpretations
“leaves the fox in charge of the henhouse” overlook the reality that a
separate category of “jurisdictional” interpretations does not exist. The foxin-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by establishing an arbitrary
179
180
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Beyond the argument that old section 7805(b) still applies fairly
broadly, the IRS and Treasury have tools at their disposal under
new section 7805(b). The IRS and Treasury may enact retroactive
rules to “prevent abuse.”186 Rules qualifying under this provision
could potentially apply to prior tax years, even if the public had no
notice from the IRS that it intended to issue a rule.187 Although
this is an area where one would expect deference post-Mayo, there
is sparse existing case law, and it is mixed in terms of deference to
the IRS.188
This Article’s observations regarding the impact of Code section
7805(b) will likely face criticism. Addressing section 7805(e),
Kristin Hickman has argued that a temporary (interim-final)
regulation cannot meet the standards of the APA unless it meets
an exception to notice and comment, such as the interpretative
rules or good cause exceptions.189 Although Professor Hickman
does not, others could attempt to build on her reasoning to argue
that section 7805(b)190 fails to relax any APA requirements.191
APA § 559 provides that a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be
held to supersede or modify [the APA] . . . except to the extent that
and undefinable category of agency decisionmaking that is accorded no
deference, but by taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases,
statutory limits on agencies’ authority. Where Congress has established a
clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the
ambiguity will fairly allow. But in rigorously applying the latter rule, a
court need not pause to puzzle over whether the interpretive question
presented is “jurisdictional.” If “the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute,” that is the end of the matter.
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984)).
186 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (2012).
187 Retroactivity is limited by the Constitution’s guarantee of substantive due process, but
the standard is very difficult to satisfy absent a reversal of a firmly established rule;
clarifying ambiguities retroactively should be permissible. See Puckett, supra note 3, at
374–83.
188 See generally McCormack, supra note 3 (surveying cases in the lower federal courts on
what constitutes an abuse of discretion in preventing abuse).
189 See Brief for Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
at 14-19, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11139) (arguing that I.R.C. § 7805(e) fails to satisfy the high threshold for recognition as an
exception from APA rulemaking).
190 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(l)(C).
191 Cf. Hickman, supra note 189 (arguing that the APA requirements are fully applicable
to Treasury regulations enacted under section 7805(e)).
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it does so expressly.”192 Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have
suggested that specification of a different standard would suffice:
Such specification both demonstrates that the organic
statute is, indeed, intended to supersede the APA and
also tells courts what sort of review to apply. A lack of
specificity deprives courts of statutory language to
guide them in reviewing agency action and thus
underscores that the APA still applies.193
The difficulty with review of tax guidance is that the Code does not
obviously or explicitly supplant the APA rulemaking procedures in
their entirety.
Professor Hickman, building on a broad reading of § 559, argues
that the good cause exception rarely applies194 and that tax
regulations are not interpretative because the disregard of a
regulation risks tax penalties.195 Hickman acknowledges that
there is nothing necessarily inconsistent in a Treasury regulation
undergoing notice-and-comment before being backdated to the
date of the notice of proposed rulemaking.196 However, others
might attempt to build on Hickman’s work to argue that the APA
practically nullifies section 7805(b), because the APA does not
generally allow backdating of legislative rules. Such an argument
seems particularly strained with respect to garden variety notice-

5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 282–83 (2007).
194 Hickman, supra note 3, at 493–94. As Professor Hickman explains, “courts generally
require agencies asserting the good cause exception to do so expressly and contemporaneously,
and with specificity and particularity.” Id. Moreover, “courts tend to be skeptical of generic
assertions of a need for immediate guidance . . . [and] generally limit the scope of the exception
to truly unusual circumstances, such as when public safety is threatened or advance notice of
a rule might undermine its application.” Id. at 494.
195 Id. at 471 (“Following the Supreme Court’s delegation premise, I contend that, at a
minimum, statutory penalties for noncompliance with agency rules should serve as a
definitive signal that Congress intended those rules to carry the force of law for both the
APA and Chevron deference.”).
196 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1193 (“[I]f Treasury is able to make a Treasury
regulation retroactively applicable to the date of the prelitigation NPRM or other notice,
then procedural challenges are of little use to the taxpayers who raise them.”).
192
193
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and-comment Treasury regulations.197 Even with respect to
temporary Treasury regulations, one could argue that Congress
has acquiesced in Treasury’s practice of undertaking postpromulgation comment.198
To be clear, this Article does not posit that section 7805(b)
supplants all APA rulemaking requirements; rather, courts should
carefully harmonize the two schemes in a manner that affords
significant effect to such a detailed and facially broad Code
provision. Giving significant effect to section 7805(b) seems more
likely Congress’s intent than for section 7805(b) to apply
principally in cases of inconsequential matters or emergencies
contemplated by the APA good cause exception (presumably
inapplicable to tax).
Yet another impediment exists to taxpayers challenging tax
regulations on procedural grounds. Pre-enforcement challenges to
regulations under the APA are the norm.199 However, the AntiInjunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act bar most preIn Enochs v.
enforcement challenges to tax regulations.200
Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,201 the Supreme Court
characterized the purpose of section 7421 as “to permit the United
States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial
intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed
sums be determined in a suit for refund.”202 Moreover, the bar
extends beyond collection situations to cases where the remedy
would indirectly affect the taxpayer’s tax liability.203 An exception
may be available only if there would be irreparable harm to the
taxpayer and “under no circumstances could the Government

197 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (noting the
importance of following Congress’s language in the organic enactment without rendering
words meaningless).
198 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
199 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149–56 (1967), overruled on other grounds,
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) (allowing for pre-enforcement review under the
APA).
200 I.R.C. § 7421 (2012); Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
201 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
202 Id. at 7.
203 See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 725 (1974) (holding that a court may not
enjoin the Service from revoking a tax exemption that, if granted, would lower a
university’s tax liability).
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ultimately prevail.”204
Meeting these requirements seems
virtually impossible, and indeed, the Supreme Court has never
found them satisfied.205
In sum, before moving on to the subtopic of adjudication, it is
appropriate to underscore the substantial implications of the
Code’s flexibility with respect to rulemaking. The grant of
retroactive rulemaking power vitiates one of the main reasons for
challenging a rule.
Suppose a party wishes to invalidate a typical non-tax rule. If
the court finds the rule procedurally deficient, the agency cannot
apply the rule until after it has undergone notice and comment
again. And it cannot apply the rule retrospectively, even though
regulated parties had notice of the agency’s intentions.206
Taxpayers, however, would not seem to have much to gain by
invalidating a regulation on procedural grounds, if the IRS may
simply reissue it and apply it retroactively (either under section
7805(b)(1) or to prevent abuse under section 7805(b)(3)).207
Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7.
See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1170–71 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s failure
to apply the Williams Packing exception is “perhaps unsurprising,” given the exacting
requirements). In Cohen v. United States, the D.C. Circuit allowed an APA challenge to a
telephone excise tax refund procedure promulgated in a notice issued without notice and
comment. 650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The opinion in Cohen seems practically
confined to the issuance of refund procedures. In distinguishing Williams Packing, the
court acknowledged:
[T]his suit is sui generis. Allowing Appellants to proceed without first filing
a refund claim will not open the courthouse door to those wishing to avoid
administrative exhaustion procedures in other cases. In the tax context,
the only APA suits subject to review would be those cases pertaining to
final agency action unrelated to tax assessment and collection. More
broadly, litigants could not avoid exhaustion when challenging agency
decisionmaking, because McCarthy and its progeny apply only when
litigants challenge the exhaustion scheme itself. And once litigated,
precedent would preclude later litigants challenging exhaustion procedures
from relying on McCarthy in a court that had previously rejected the same
argument.
Id. at 733.
206 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–20 (2012) (holding that a retroactive reversal of the FCC’s guidelines
concerning fleeting expletives violated due process on account of vagueness and failure to
give fair notice to regulated parties).
207 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1193–94 (“If a reviewing court is likely to conclude that
Treasury’s pursuit of notice and comment in finalizing regulations cures the procedural
flaws of the preceding temporary ones, then taxpayers gain nothing from raising procedural
challenges against Treasury’s earlier procedural failures. Likewise, if Treasury is able to
204
205
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3.
Judicial Review of Legal Conclusions in Rulemaking.
Assuming that an agency’s rules survive procedural review, a
court may need to further consider whether to respect the agency’s
conclusions in such guidance. Courts generally defer, to some
extent, to the positions of an agency vested with authority to
implement the relevant statute.208 Deference regimes to some
extent respect separation of powers and comparative institutional
advantage at policymaking.209 If Chevron applies, there is little
more for a reviewing court to do, because Chevron essentially is a
subset of arbitrary and capricious review.210 However, if the less
deferential Skidmore framework applies, the position of an agency
is entitled to deference to the extent the position is persuasive,
taking into account such factors as “the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”211 Which of
these frameworks applies can sometimes be an exercise in
guesswork.212
Although Mayo clarified that notice and comment Treasury
regulations qualify for Chevron deference,213 many unsettled
questions remain in the area of judicial review of tax guidance.
For example, do temporary Treasury regulations qualify for
Chevron deference? Are they void ab initio? Similar questions
arise with respect to subregulatory guidance, such as IRS Revenue
Rulings and IRS Notices. As discussed above, Professor Hickman
has suggested that Treasury regulations or even subregulatory
make a Treasury regulation retroactively applicable to the date of the prelitigation NPRM
or other notice, then procedural challenges are of little use to the taxpayers who raise
them.”).
208 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
833–34 (2001) (describing Chevron’s expansion of judicial deference to agencies).
209 See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 124–25, 139–49 (1994) (comparing the advantages of
agencies versus courts); cf. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 208, at 865–66 (discussing the
idea that deference is a second-best solution to the nondelegation doctrine).
210 See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating “our analysis would be
the same” under Chevron step two and APA arbitrary and capricious review).
211 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
212 See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2013) (likening to a
lottery administrative agencies’ menu of procedural choices and the linkage to muddled
deference doctrines).
213 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011).
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rules promulgated without notice and comment are, because of
applicable penalty provisions, vulnerable to procedural challenge,
though taxpayers may have little interest in overturning
regulations that address “minor housekeeping matters.”214
Another potential approach would be for courts to defer under
Skidmore prior to tax guidance undergoing notice and comment.
The underlying assumption would be that rules can be
interpretative despite the existence of penalty provisions.215 If, on
the other hand, a rule is legislative and no exemption from APA
notice and comment applies, rather than invalidating the rule,
courts could remand the relevant matter to the IRS and Treasury
for further consideration.
Even given the IRS and Treasury’s retroactive rulemaking
power, it would be disruptive if courts invalidated most tax
guidance issued without notice and comment.216 The IRS and
Treasury might not choose to take the time to reissue every
particular rule that the courts invalidate; they might simply turn
to enforcement by litigation rather than giving general guidance.
In addition, given the impetus from a court to redo a rulemaking,
the IRS and Treasury may modify the rules, upsetting
expectations at the margins.
B. ADJUDICATION

Rulemaking is not a practical way to address every matter
conceivably before an agency. Sometimes agencies do not discover
policy problems before they are presented with a concrete factual
situation. Moreover, given the intensiveness of judicial review of
rulemaking, agencies may conclude that it is better to forego
rulemaking and make policy through adjudication.217 As discussed
below, the choice between rulemaking and adjudication generally
214

See Hickman, supra note 3, at 471–72; see also supra notes 189–98 and accompanying

text.
215 See Puckett, supra note 3, at 367–74 (arguing that Skidmore deference is appropriate if
there has not been an opportunity for meaningful public participation).
216 See Hickman, supra note 3, at 530–31 (“Categorically invalidating and remanding
Treasury regulations with temporary origins would upset taxpayers’ settled expectations
and could seem more arbitrary and capricious than leaving the regulations in place
notwithstanding their procedural flaws.”).
217 See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing how agencies may choose
adjudication over rulemaking outside the tax context).
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is flexible.218
Somewhat different—though still deferential—
standards govern judicial review of a typical administrative
agency’s formal adjudication.219 Tax adjudication, however, is
special because it is largely informal at the IRS level;220
accordingly, the IRS is unable to maintain control over
adjudication in the manner that a more typical agency may use to
accomplish its regulatory goals.
1. Adjudication under the APA. In the landmark Chenery II
decision, after acknowledging that prospective rulemaking would
generally be optimal, the Supreme Court afforded agencies wide
discretion to make policy through retrospective adjudication:
[A]ny rigid requirement to that effect would make the
administrative process inflexible and incapable of
dealing with many of the specialized problems which
arise. Not every principle essential to the effective
administration of a statute can or should be cast
immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some
principles must await their own development, while
others must be adjusted to meet particular,
unforeseeable situations. In performing its important
functions
in
these
respects,
therefore,
an
administrative agency must be equipped to act either
by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon
one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to
exalt form over necessity.221
The word “adjudication” may conjure an image of a trial-like
proceeding. However, for APA purposes, adjudication can also be a
catch-all category for the residual of agency action that is not
rulemaking.222 This does include trial-like proceedings,223 but also
includes informal determinations such as whether a letter bears
See infra notes 221–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
220 See infra notes 243–49 and accompanying text.
221 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
222 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–555 (2012).
223 See Michael Ray, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative
Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 382 (2009) (discussing the formal
proceedings required in §§ 556–557).
218
219
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the correct postage. If the organic statute requires a hearing on
the record, trial-type procedures are triggered.224 However, an
agency may choose to provide a more formal process even if it is
not required to abide by the on-the-record hearing requirements of
the APA.225
Agency adjudication has long been a staple method for
administrative agencies affecting important rights of regulated
parties.226 But it has, at the same time, been controversial in some
quarters.
The declaration of a principle and simultaneous
application of it to the party in an adjudication provides little
notice to regulated parties.227 Moreover, a classical conception of
separation of powers would be offended by the vesting of quasijudicial functions in the same body that makes rules and
prosecutes violations of those rules.228
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the landmark Chenery II
case upheld the discretion of agencies to choose to make policy
through adjudication rather than rulemaking.229 In NLRB v. Bell
224 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). The Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on whether a
hearing requirement in the context of adjudication triggers formal adjudication, but has
held that a mere hearing requirement does not require formal procedures in the context of a
rulemaking. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (noting
that a “hearing” requirement, without more, does not trigger formal procedures in the
context of a rulemaking). The lower federal courts (except for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit) have generally tracked Florida East Coast Railway, even in the context
of adjudication, looking for a requirement that the hearing be “on the record” to trigger
formal adjudication procedures. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We will henceforth make no presumption that a statutory ‘hearing’
requirement does or does not compel the agency to undertake a formal ‘hearing on the
record,’ thereby leaving it to the agency, as an initial matter, to resolve the ambiguity.”).
But see Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977) (“In summary, the
crucial question is not whether particular talismanic language was used but whether the
proceedings under review fall within that category of quasi-judicial proceedings deserving of
special procedural protections.”).
225 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (“[A]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights . . . .”).
226 In fact, Chenery II itself dealt with an SEC adjudication that imposed novel restraints
on a corporation. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 201–09.
227 See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 930 (2004)
(quoting Judge Williams describing agency adjudication as “ad hocery . . . that affords less
notice . . . to affected parties” than informal rulemaking (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993))).
228 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
229 Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203 (stating that “the choice made between proceeding by
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency”).
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Aerospace Co., the Court reaffirmed this principle of agency
discretion, permitting the NLRB to reverse policy through an
adjudication.230 However, dicta suggests that an agency may not
impose an obligation retroactively where a party will suffer
“substantial” harm for actions taken in “good-faith reliance” on
The scholarly consensus is that such
prior guidance.231
disallowance should be rare and unusual.232
2. Judicial Review of Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusions.
Courts review agency findings of fact in adjudicatory proceedings
under the “substantial evidence” test.233 For legal conclusions, the
same principles of judicial review applicable to legal conclusions in
rulemaking apply.234 As discussed above, legal conclusions may
receive either Chevron deference (the agency’s conclusion stands if
it is not arbitrary and capricious) or Skidmore deference (the
agency’s conclusion receives deference to the extent of its power to
persuade based on all the facts and circumstances).235 In United
States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court held that Chevron

416 U.S. 267, 292–94 (1974).
Id. at 295; see also Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51,
60 & n.12 (1984) (refusing to adopt a “flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances
run against the Government” and noting that “this principle also underlies the doctrine that
an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would
unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests” (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295;
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1973) (plurality
opinion); Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203)).
232 Pierce summarizes the state of the law as follows:
The Court has not even suggested that a court can constrain an agency’s
choice between rulemaking and adjudication in any opinion since Bell
Aerospace. Nor has it suggested any content that might be given its vague
reference to “abuse of discretion” as a potential basis for reversing an
agency’s decision to rely on adjudication as a means of announcing a “rule.”
Thus, [the court decisions on the subject] must be taken as a flat rejection
of any judicial attempt to constrain agencies from developing “rules”
through the adjudicatory process.
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.9 (5th ed. 2010); cf.
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
523–24 (1978) (holding that the APA provides ceiling and floor procedural
requirements for rulemaking unless Congress otherwise provides).
233 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
234 Id. § 706(2)(A); see also supra Part III.A.3 (describing judicial review of legal
conclusions in rulemaking).
235 See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
230
231
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generally applies to legal conclusions arrived at through formal—
but generally not informal—adjudication.236
The arbitrary and capricious standard237 is a useful comparator
for thinking about the meaning of “substantial evidence.” Some
administrative law scholars have concluded that there is no
difference, in practice, between the two standards.238 As Magill
explains,
[S]ome members of Congress viewed the scope-ofreview provisions as a response to insufficiently
rigorous judicial review of agency factfinding . . . that
courts had upheld agency factual determinations if
there was any evidence (even a “mere scintilla”) in the
record supporting the agency’s conclusions, without
regard to the evidence in the record that contradicted
or cast doubt on the supporting evidence.239
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court defined
the standard as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”240
3. De Novo Review of Tax Deficiency Determinations. The
adjudication of tax controversies is, like tax rulemaking, very
specialized. The system relies, at the first level, on individual
taxpayers voluntarily assessing their tax liability and filing a
return if their income exceeds the filing threshold.241 At the first
stage, each taxpayer has the responsibility of organizing their
records and taking the first shot at determining their income. The
IRS reviews the return and compares it against matching data it
has received from other sources, may request additional
236 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (observing that
“Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation
that should underlie a pronouncement of such force,” and that “the overwhelming number of
our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication”).
237 See supra Part III.A.1.
238 See Magill, supra note 170, at 1428–30 (describing the malleability of both standards
in practice).
239 Id. at 1428–29.
240 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
241 See I.R.C. §§ 6011–6012 (2012).
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information, or may conduct an audit of a randomly selected
taxpayer.242 If the IRS disagrees with the taxpayer’s conclusion as
to how much tax is due, it must give the taxpayer notice before
The
technically assessing and collecting the deficiency.243
statutory notice provides the taxpayer an opportunity to protest
the deficiency in Tax Court without first paying the tax due.244
However, if the taxpayer pays the full amount of tax due, the
taxpayer has the option of suing in district court or the Court of
Federal Claims for a refund.245
In tax deficiency litigation, facts are adjudicated de novo246 in
the Tax Court as well as in refund courts.247 The court will also
rule on legal issues, potentially applying a deference doctrine, and
enter a judgment without remanding to the IRS.248 This is also
distinct from general administrative agency practice, where
remand is the normal remedy if the agency has not adequately
explained its decision when it initially considers the matter at
hand.249
242 See id. §§ 6201–6203 (assessment of tax liability); cf. Kenneth H. Ryesky, Taxation
Unchecked and Unbalance: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Sorrentino, 41
GONZ. L. REV. 505, 524 (2006) (discussing the privacy implications of the IRS’s information
gathering enforcement methods).
243 I.R.C. § 6212 (2012).
244 Id. § 6213(a).
245 Id. § 7422; Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163 (1960) (discussing the two types of
tribunals available for taxpayers, dependent on pre-payment or post-payment of the
assessment due).
246 Stephanie Hoffer and Chris Walker examine adjudication by the Tax Court and argue
for application of the ordinary remand rule; however, their argument primarily applies to
limited groups of cases: innocent spouse determinations, collection due process matters, or
other instances where the trial de novo provisions do not apply. See Stephanie R. Hoffer &
Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 267–
68 (2014).
247 See Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection
Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 438–39 (2008) (discussing the level of discretion
employed by the Tax Court).
248 See I.R.C. §§ 6214–6215 (giving the Tax Court jurisdiction to determine deficiencies;
Id. § 7482(c)(1) (giving the United States Courts of Appeals the power to affirm, modify, or
reverse the decision of the Tax Court, “with or without remanding the case for rehearing”).
249 See 3 PIERCE, supra note 232, § 18.1. In the landmark Chenery I decision, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that agency action normally is set aside until the agency can
articulate a justifiable explanation for its action:
In finding that the Commission’s order cannot be sustained, we are not
imposing any trammels on its powers. We are not enforcing formal
requirements. We are not suggesting that the Commission must justify its
exercise of administrative discretion in any particular manner or with

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/17/2015 11:46 AM

STRUCTURAL TAX EXCEPTIONALISM

1109

IV. INTERROGATING STRUCTURAL TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
Having surveyed the structural differences between tax
administration and the agency template under the APA,250 it
appears that Mayo’s end to tax exceptionalism is really more of a
change in nomenclature than a paradigm shift. Beyond the
legalistic conclusion that tax exceptionalism is not truly dead, the
question remains whether structural tax exceptionalism is more
than just historical accident. Accordingly, this Part interrogates
structural tax exceptionalism across three important policy
criteria: effective use of agency expertise, procedural fairness, and
incentives to choose rulemaking versus adjudication.
These
observations are necessarily preliminary and lay a foundation for
future work in this area.
A. EXPERTISE

One of the primary goals of delegating the implementation of
statutory schemes to agencies is to have an impartial, expert
decisionmaker develop more specific, coherent policies.251 Thus,
one of the first questions to ask about structural tax
exceptionalism is whether it bears a high cost in terms of foregone
benefits of agency expertise.
As this Article has argued, tax rulemaking is generally far more
flexible than the APA template, granting the IRS and Treasury
wide latitude to implement policy by rule.252 Although structural
tax exceptionalism surely facilitates the rulemaking modality, one
could question whether tax adjudication facilitates the use of
agency expertise as well.253 Two key departures from the APA
adjudication template stand in the way of agency expertise. The
IRS is not able to develop a record, find the facts, and confine

artistic refinement. We are not sticking in the bark of words. We merely
hold that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds
upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon
which its action can be sustained.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
250 See supra Part III.
251 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 23, at 777.
252 See supra Part III.A.2.
253 See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 246, at 273–76.
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judicial review to a record that has already been developed.254
Moreover, a reviewing court generally will not remand a case to
the IRS for further consideration in a tax controversy.255
It is debatable whether the fact finding function in isolation
makes a significant difference in terms of expertise. Indeed, it is
conceivable that courts are superior to the IRS at looking at
extremely varied factual settings and evaluating credibility.
Theoretically, even mixed questions can be separated into
questions of fact and law, though the distinction can be quite
elusive.256 Provided that the IRS receives appropriate deference
on the legal elements in a mixed question, the fact that a court
finds facts is not so troubling. That last proviso, however, soon
turns out to be a weak spot in tax administration.
The lack of formal adjudicatory power of the IRS goes beyond
just factfinding. Under the Supreme Court’s framework in Mead,
the IRS will not receive Chevron deference on its legal conclusions,
absent a prior tax rule to apply.257 Accordingly, the application of
tax expertise is hampered compared to the APA baseline. In
contrast, the SEC may, if it prefers, formulate and at the same
time apply broad standards to a regulated party in a formal
adjudication. It would, in turn, receive Chevron deference on its
legal conclusions.258 Chevron had not been decided at the time of
the Supreme Court’s landmark Chenery II decision; however, the
SEC’s announcement of a new standard in a formal adjudication259
now would receive Chevron deference under Mead.260 But the
informal process of the IRS sending a notice of deficiency is
undoubtedly too informal to generate deference under the
See supra Part III.B.3 (noting courts’ de novo review of facts in tax controversies).
See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 246, at 273–76
256 See Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835,
1867–72 & n.168 (2014).
257 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–33 (2001) (refusing to apply
Chevron deference to agency determinations that are “far removed . . . from notice-andcomment rulemaking”). If the IRS is interpreting a preexisting agency rule or regulation
(an agency authority—not just the Code), a Chevron-like doctrine variously known as Auer
or Seminole Rock suggests that the IRS’s interpretation would control unless “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).
258 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
260 See supra note 236.
254
255
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apparent Mead safe harbors,261 nor does a notice of deficiency seem
like the kind of agency process that Congress would have expected
to receive deference (the more general thesis of Mead).262
Moreover, even outside of situations where deference doctrines
truly make a difference, it is conceivable that the failure of courts
to remand to the IRS in tax litigation promotes dysfunctional
agency behavior and hampers reasoned decisionmaking. With
respect to the latter, it may be overly optimistic to expect coherent
decisionmaking from the IRS given that the IRS does not really
know what the facts are before it litigates in court. Because
parties can introduce new evidence at trial, and all findings of fact
are subject to de novo review by the court,263 applying the law to
the facts at the IRS level is something of a guessing game. This is
very much unlike the APA template where the court’s review is
strictly limited to the record adduced at the agency level,264 and
the agency’s fact findings should be respected if supported by
substantial evidence.265 Making the IRS just another litigant in
controversies rather than reserving for it a more quasi-judicial role
probably tends to promote exaggerated, litigation-oriented
argumentation that is unhelpful to taxpayers as guidance of
general applicability. If matters were remanded to the IRS when a
reviewing court is unsatisfied with the agency’s explanation, it
would give the IRS a better chance to formulate durable and
general principles of tax law and policy.
Remands, of course, have potential drawbacks. They are
potentially costly in terms of agency and court resources.
Moreover, in the tax context, interest is accruing, and the taxpayer
261 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31 (describing the situations where Chevron deference is
appropriate).
262 See id. at 229–34 (describing the situation in Mead that did not warrant Chevron
deference).
263 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1822–23 (2014) (noting that review of facts is de novo,
and arguing that the Tax Court is a “reviewing” court even though it considers evidence not
considered by the agency).
264 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (holding
that the record for review of adjudication was the record before the agency at the time of its
decision and not a new record created on judicial review of the agency’s action); cf. United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248–50, 253 (2d Cir. 1977) (invalidating
FDA rules for processing fish because the notice of proposed rulemaking failed to include
significant data upon which the FDA relied and noting that de novo evidence was properly
excluded by the district court).
265 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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may be prejudiced by delay. Finally, not all tax controversies
feature issues that would truly benefit substantially from a
remand.266 On balance, however, it seems premature to conclude
that remands could never be optimal particularly if the forum is
the Tax Court, where the taxpayer is less likely to suffer from
acute liquidity issues.
B. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND TAXPAYER MORALE

It is often said that our tax system depends critically on
voluntary compliance.267 Accordingly, it is important that
taxpayers respect the system; otherwise, they may cheat more
and, indirectly, cause everyone else to pay more. Nancy Welsh
comments that
Although issues of procedural justice often do not
attract as much public attention as concerns about
distributive justice, research has shown that when
people experience dispute resolution and decisionmaking procedures, they “pay a great deal of attention
to the way things are done [i.e., how decisions are

266 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1196. Hickman has questioned the potential benefits
of a remand. “Theoretically, the court could also remand the taxpayer’s individual case to
the IRS for further adjudication in light of its invalidation of the underlying regulation, but
to what end?” Id.
267 See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(2004). Professor Camp cogently observes that:
Like many clichés, however, “voluntary self-assessment” is true in a more
significant sense than it is false. The tax determination process ultimately
rests on taxpayers disclosing their financial affairs and paying what they
owe—through withholding or otherwise—without overt government
compulsion. It is “voluntary” in the same sense that stopping one’s car at a
red light—at midnight with no traffic and no one looking—is voluntary. It
is each citizen’s self-enforcement of the legal duty that keeps both the tax
and transportation systems running smoothly. With over 130 million
individual returns and over 80 million other returns (not including
information returns) filed in calendar year 2001, the system depends on the
veracity, if not the kindness, of taxpayers.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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made] and the nuances of their treatment by
others.”268
Moreover, perceptions of procedural justice often have a strong
effect on perceptions of distributional fairness (and much stronger
than the reverse effect).269
Design of tax adjudication should heed these teachings. Studies
have shown a strong preference for a traditional adversarial trial
rather than an inquisitorial process in which the same party
Moreover, given the pervasive
investigates and decides.270
mistrust of the IRS, one should especially hesitate to consider
combining formal adjudication under the umbrella of the IRS
rather than vesting such power primarily in the courts.
Differentiating tax adjudication, which involves not only repeat
players with large claims but also individuals and small
businesses, has some basis in empirical work showing that
institutional litigants care little about procedural fairness and
focus only on the outcome.271
The Code’s vesting of formal adjudication primarily with the
courts, rather than with the IRS (as the APA template would
otherwise provide), appears to have important benefits for
taxpayer perceptions of fairness.272 All other things being equal,
perceptions that the system is fair should increase willingness to
268 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do
With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817–18 (2001) (quoting E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 242 (1988)); see also Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2009)
(noting the significance of procedural justice for institutional legitimacy and voluntary
compliance); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 435–39 (1992)
(discussing the psychological impact of judicial procedures); William G. Young & Jordan M.
Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court
Productivity, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 55, 56–59 (2014) (advocating a definition of judicial
productivity that incorporates measures of accuracy and procedural fairness).
269 Welsh, supra note 268, at 818–19.
270 See Burch, supra note 268, at 29 (citing JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 104 (1975)).
271 See Welsh, supra note 268, at 818 nn.148–49 (citing studies that suggest a distinction
between individual and institutional litigants).
272 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–20, 22, 59–62, 147–50, 162–63, 178,
234–35 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of the law’s consistency with prevailing norms
of justice within a particular community and noting specifically that the low non-compliance
with income tax is explainable from a normative, but not instrumentalist, perspective).
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pay or decrease willingness to cheat. One countervailing feature is
the Code’s grant of retroactive rulemaking authority to the IRS
and Treasury. To the extent that this seems quasi-adjudicatory, it
could also seem unfair that the IRS and Treasury are able to issue
such guidance. However, retroactive application of rules can be a
powerful tool to (1) prevent abuse or (2) apply the same rules to
similarly situated taxpayers with tax years still open under the
statute of limitations on assessment. On balance, these latter
features should promote perceptions of fairness, assuming the rule
is a clarification rather than unexpected change.
The principal cost of vesting formal adjudication with the courts
is the tendency of courts to reach disparate outcomes on similar
facts.273 This bears at least two kinds of costs. First, complexity
makes tax planning more difficult and expensive.
Second,
applying different rules to similarly situated taxpayers can lead to
perceptions of unfairness.
On the other hand, a defense of decentralized decisionmaking
can be made. Ronald Krotoszynski, in assessing whether the
judicial power of the United States should be more centralized,
makes a persuasive defense of our current (decentralized) system
of judicial circuits:
By making the decisional process on important, but
difficult, questions of constitutional law a collective
endeavor, placed in entirely separate hands, operating
largely independently of each other, the risk of
insufficiently considered—reasoned—decision making
is substantially reduced (as are some of the risks of
collective, collegial decision making, such as so-called
“group think”). When disparate and independent
courts ask and answer the same question and render

273 See, e.g., Bryna Lee Rosen, Note, The Home Office Deduction Game: Will Soliman v.
Commissioner Return the Taxpayer to Square One?, 12 VA. TAX REV. 141, 148 (1992)
(describing a situation where Tax Court adjudication became so disparate that Congress
intervened).
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the same answer, the legitimacy of that answer is
greatly enhanced.274
One of the key benefits of decentralized judicial decisionmaking is
capture avoidance.275 “By decentralizing the federal courts and
creating separate juridical entities that operate more or less
entirely independently of each other, Congress has greatly reduced
the risk of agency capture with respect to the federal courts.”276
Independent from the anti-capture protection of the courts,
Krotoszynski argues that decentralized decisionmaking helps
avoid cognitive bias or dysfunction, such as “groupthink.”277
Groupthink is most likely a problem for a cohesive, insulated
group.278 As a threshold matter, the IRS and Treasury may simply
not be the kind of institutions that are likely to be prone to
groupthink, given the number of employees and their different
backgrounds. However, it is possible that certain subgroups in the
agency could be at risk. Symptoms of groupthink vary, but
notably include taking extreme positions and overconfidence,
especially in the morality of the group as opposed to outsiders.279
Another dysfunctional group dynamic is social loafing, or
diminished individual effort toward group products, in part
because obtaining credit for one’s contribution may be difficult or
impossible.280
Although more immediate simplicity and consistency can be
attractive, the legitimacy benefits of hundreds of different judges,
from different political backgrounds, considering tax matters is
also attractive. On the other hand, because the IRS and Treasury
have the power to promulgate very specific rules and even
retroactive rules, they have some discretion to effectively opt out of

274 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the
Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2014)
(footnote omitted).
275 Id. at 1050.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1066 (“Although the available evidence is mixed, in general creating a plethora of
diverse and independent decision makers should improve the quality of the decisional
process and, by implication, the quality of the decisions themselves.”).
278 Id.
279 Id. at 1067.
280 Id. at 1071.
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adjudication on certain issues, if they are willing to undertake the
procedures required for the rulemaking process.
C. CHOICE OF POLICYMAKING MODALITY

As is perhaps evident from the Supreme Court’s decades-old
dicta in Chenery II, most commentators would prefer, all other
things being equal, that agencies make policy through prospective
rules to the extent reasonably feasible.281 However, as Elizabeth
Magill aptly has stated,
Each form should be thought of as a package with
specific features—the procedure the agency must
follow; whether and how the agency’s action binds
private parties; whether and when the agency’s action
can be challenged in court; and the standard that a
court will apply when that suit is brought.282
Accordingly, an agency cannot necessarily be expected to utilize
rulemaking rather than adjudication, even if it has notice of a
potential issue about which the public would benefit from
guidance.283
281 See supra note 221 and accompanying text; Magill, supra note 170, at 1396 (“A
common lament is that agency reliance on administrative adjudication in the enforcement
context is unfair because it permits the agency to pick a sympathetic target and to present
its view in a friendly forum (depending on the agency), and may mean that a newly minted
legal obligation will be imposed retroactively on a single target.”).
282 Magill, supra note 170, at 1396.
283 Mark Grunewald has explained why the NLRB failed to engage in rulemaking for
approximately fifty years, despite “[d]ecades of critical commentary, frequent prodding from
reviewing courts, and legislative proposals for mandatory rulemaking.”
Mark H.
Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274,
274–75 (1991) (footnotes omitted). When the NLRB turned to considering whether
rulemaking would be desirable, the meeting was contentious, considering such factors as
(1) whether rulemaking would stimulate the submission of useful empirical
data or would simply attract the same generalized legal/policy arguments
heard in adjudications; (2) whether the data that might be submitted would
provide as reliable a basis for policymaking as the evidence that is admitted
and tested through cross-examination in adjudications; (3) whether loss of
the assumed sensitivity of case-by-case consideration would be offset by the
assumed speed and efficiency of a generalized approach; (4) whether the
process of proposing and possibly modifying proposed rules calls into
question or enhances the concept of Board expertise; (5) whether the
Board’s regulated constituencies would find rulemaking credible and
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As discussed in Part III, a typical agency may bind through a
formal adjudication and receive a strong degree of deference on
both findings of fact and legal conclusions. With two of the factors
(bindingness and deference) being roughly equal, for a typical
agency, the remaining key consideration is whether the procedures
for formal adjudication are less demanding than those of informal
rulemaking. And indeed, there is a sense that “hard look” review
for rulemaking has rendered rulemaking very burdensome.284
Accordingly, agencies often may have an incentive to avoid
rulemaking and instead announce new policies through
adjudication.
Because of the unusual features of tax rulemaking and
adjudication, the incentives are reversed. Tax rulemaking is
generally more flexible and less likely to be challenged on
procedural grounds in any event because the Anti-Injunction Act
and Declaratory Judgment Act almost always postpone challenges
to regulations until after enforcement.285 Meanwhile, adjudication
is not as tempting an alternative to rulemaking, because tax
adjudication at the agency level does not follow APA formal
Facing de novo review at the
adjudication procedures.286
reviewing court, the IRS could attempt to narrow the issues by
rulemaking.
In this instance, structural tax exceptionalism appears to carry
a benefit in that it promotes rulemaking over adjudication. That
incentive is generally beneficial because rulemaking provides
guidance and allows effective planning. However, for those who
value the public participation element of rulemaking, the current
system arguably comes up short because comments often may
follow promulgation of a rule.287 On balance, however, postparticipate; and (6) whether the Board could continue to adjust policy
through adjudication having undertaken rulemaking.
Id. at 293.
284 See Manning, supra note 227, at 914 n.117 (noting that the doctrine has “greatly
increased the cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking by intensifying the agencies’
obligation to release material data as part of the relevant notice, to create a rulemaking
‘record’ for judicial review, and to respond to important issues raised during the comment
period”).
285 See supra Part III.A.2.
286 See supra Part III.B.2.
287 Cf. Hickman, supra note 3, at 519–20 (“Much like the legislative process, the APA’s
notice and comment requirements provide the agency with ‘the facts and information
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promulgation consideration of comments may be a reasonable
price to pay for increased prospective guidance.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has interrogated the prevailing wisdom that tax
exceptionalism is dead, a common refrain that the Supreme
Undertaking a
Court’s decision in Mayo288 has sparked.
comparative historical and structural analysis of tax
administration side by side with typical agency administration,
one important contribution of this Article is to clarify that
applying Mayo’s mandate to apply a “uniform”289 approach carries
a very thin, residual effect. That is because the structure of tax
administration—in terms of rulemaking and adjudication—is so
exceptional.
Beyond the legalistic conclusion that neither reviewing courts
nor the IRS and Treasury can truly escape tax exceptionalism, this
Article has identified important historical and current policy
justifications for the persistence of structural tax exceptionalism.
Moreover, it shows how the unusual features of tax rulemaking
and adjudication articulate with one another in a reasonably
coherent, though extremely complicated, manner. Although there
may be benefits to reshaping the structure of tax administration to
be less exceptional (i.e., more like most other federal
administrative agencies), there are also likely to be complicated
advantages and disadvantages to such a shift.
The benefits of assimilation to the APA template could include
more consistent and fairer outcomes and enhanced use of the
expertise of the IRS and Treasury. However, the tax system may,
for pragmatic cultural reasons, require more judicial control over
tax controversies and more flexibility with respect to the issuance
of guidance than a typical federal administrative agency.
Assimilation to the APA template could potentially mean less
guidance through rulemaking, more case by case adjudication,
relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well as suggestions for alternative
solutions,’ and ‘reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after
governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies.’ ” (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
288 Mayo Found. for Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
289 Id. at 713 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).
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lower taxpayer morale, and lower voluntary tax compliance.
Accordingly, this Article urges caution before ending structural tax
exceptionalism in a quest for more uniform administrative law.
Uniformity is an important value, to be sure, but it is not the only
relevant consideration at stake.

